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Thesis Summary
The purpose of this work was to evaluate potential hazards and failures as part of
the design and economic analysis for a chemical plant that would produce 150,000 tons of
ethylene oxide per year[1]. The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) method of analysis was
used to accomplish this goal. This method of hazard analysis involves brainstorming
potential errors in a system by examining each element of each process unit in full detail.
This project was focused on the reactor unit because the reactor has several important
parameters that could fail, resulting in safety issues within the system. Input for this
analysis was received from the other members of the process team: Justin Brown, Alyssa
Matarazzo, and Kyle Tynan as well as faculty mentors Dr. Thomas Stanford and Dr.
Vincent Van Brunt.
Through this analysis, many areas of concern for plant safety were found such as
the ratio of hydrocarbon to oxygen causing an explosion hazard in the reactor, and the
buildup of pressure in the reactor causing equipment failure. Additionally, safety
precautions have been suggested such as adding a pressure relief system to the reactor,
implementing controls on process parameters such as temperature and pressure, and
writing emergency shutdown procedures in the case of system malfunction. These safety
precautions are important for protecting the employees of the plant and the surrounding
community.
Introduction
The goal of this report was to complete a detailed Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)
analysis of the ethylene oxide production plant to complement the design and economic
analysis of the plant conducted by the design group consisting of: Justin Brown, Samantha
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Ciricillo, Alyssa Matarazzo, and Kyle Tynan[1]. The ethylene oxide plant was designed
based on extensive research into industrial practices as well as literature on the chemistry
and chemical kinetics of the direct oxidation of ethylene using a silver supported alumina
oxide catalyst[2]. The chemical plant was designed to produce approximately 150,000 tons
per year of ethylene oxide. The process was modeled using the Aspen HYSYS program
and the process flow diagram was considered for this analysis.
Process Description
Ethylene oxide can be produced from ethylene in a number of ways; however, the
most common industrial practice is to form ethylene oxide through the direct oxidation of
ethylene with pure oxygen[2]. The reactant streams include a mixture of light hydrocarbons
that is 94% ethylene as well as 99.5% pure oxygen[1]. The product stream will be mostly
pure ethylene oxide as well as a waste liquid stream and vent gas streams. The by-products
of this process are mostly water and carbon dioxide[2]. The process flow diagram for the
process can be found in Appendix A and is taken directly from the Aspen HYSYS model
simulation.
Table 1: Component List for Hydrocarbon Reactant Stream
Component
Methane
Ethylene
Ethane
Propylene
Propane

Mole Fraction
0.02
0.94
0.03
0.007
0.003

This process begins by separating the mixture of light hydrocarbons that includes
methane, ethane, ethylene, propane and propene in order to get a high purity of ethylene[1].
The mole fractions of each component in the stream can be found in Table 1. This
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separation involves two distillation columns in series to remove the methane in the first
column and the ethane, propylene and propane in the second from the material steam. After
these separations, the stream is mixed with the pure oxygen and a recycle stream. Then,
this reactant stream is fed into the reactor. In the reactor, three main reactions are occurring,
which are the reactions considered in the model. The main reaction is the direct oxidation
of ethylene to ethylene oxide. Additionally, ethylene and ethylene oxide undergo complete
combustion to form carbon dioxide and water[1]. The reactor is a plug flow reactor with
silver supported alumina oxide catalyst inside the tubes. This catalyst is proven to enhance
the direct oxidation reaction.
After the reactor, the stream goes into an absorber. This separates most of the vent
gases (carbon dioxide, oxygen and ethylene) from the water and ethylene oxide. The water
and ethylene oxide mixture then goes through a refining process to remove the water and
remaining vent gases, so the product is 99.73% pure ethylene oxide. The vent gases are
treated in an amine absorber to remove carbon dioxide and then recycled to the reactor to
react any remaining ethylene and oxygen[1]. During the process, it is important to pay
attention to the lower and upper flammability limits of ethylene to avoid potential explosion
hazards. At 25 °C and 1 atmosphere, the lower flammability limit for ethylene is 2.79%
and the upper flammability limit for ethylene is 22.30%. The lower flammability limit for
ethylene at the reactor temperature (240 °C) and pressure (2100 kPa) is 3.27%, while the
upper flammability limit for ethylene at these conditions is 49.48%. The calculations for
this data can be found in Appendix C.
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Implementation of HAZOP Study
HAZOP analysis is a well-accepted and effective tool used extensively in industry.
It is a formal procedure to identify hazards in a chemical production plant as well as
determining precautions to prevent these hazards[3]. A HAZOP analysis is a structured and
systematic evaluation of a planned process in order to assess potential risks in the process.
The ultimate goal of this work was to determine potential hazards and safety issues in the
design and implement actions to improve the safety of this process and protect the lives of
those who work in the plant.
Description of HAZOP Methodology[3],[4]
The basic idea of the HAZOP methodology is to brainstorm in a controlled,
methodical fashion in order to consider all potential operational failures that can occur in
a chemical process[3]. The first step was to gather a team of people composed of a cross
section of experienced professionals from different backgrounds[3]. A HAZOP analysis is
always done in a group[4]. Because this work was conducted in an academic setting, the
analysis was mainly done individually with some input from peers and mentors as detailed
in the section labeled “Time of HAZOP Study and Participants of HAZOP Study Group”.
This procedure typically starts by looking at an up-to-date process flow diagram, such as
the one in Appendix A. Other process information such as material and energy balances,
materials of construction, and equipment specifications were also considered.
Next, the process was considered as a whole to determine which process unit has
the highest potential for hazards. It was determined that the plug flow reactor would be the
best unit to look at since it is a key unit in the process and has many process parameters.
Once the study node was chosen to be the reactor, the intent of the study node was
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identified[3]. The intent of the reactor is to facilitate the reaction of ethylene and oxygen to
produce ethylene oxide using a silver supported alumina catalyst for efficiency.
Once the initial steps were finished, process parameters for the reactor were
determined. These parameters included ethylene flow, oxygen flow, ethylene oxide flow,
temperature, pressure, reactor volume, etcetera, which were determined during the design
of the plant. These parameters were used to describe potential failures in the process that
could cause safety issues. Then, guide words were applied to each process parameter to
describe specific failures that may occur. These guide words are described in Table 2. Not
every guide word was applicable to every process parameters, and some combinations did
not produce potential hazards. This procedure could produce hundreds of combinations,
but only those that were brainstormed and could produce potential hazards were
considered. The combinations of guide words and process parameters are described more
fully in the “Deviation” column of the HAZOP analysis table, which can be found in
Appendix B.
Table 2: Guide Words for HAZOP Analysis[3]
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Once the combinations of guide words and parameters were chosen, possible causes
were considered. Many different occurrences could be the cause of the same failure, so a
list of potential causes was created in the analysis table. Additionally, a list of possible
consequences for each guide word/parameter combination was also added to the analysis
table. These two columns of the table were considered to form the final column of the
analysis table, “Actions Required”. The final HAZOP analysis table can be found in
Appendix B of this report. If this ethylene oxide plant were to be actually conducted based
on the proposed design, the required actions would need to be finished in a timely manner,
and all process hazard analyses would need to be updated every 3 years[4].
Time of HAZOP Study and Participants of HAZOP Study Group
This HAZOP analysis took place during the period of January to April of 2019. The
analysis was completed concurrently with the design of the process and was continually
updated as the process design was updated. This analysis was mainly led and completed
by Samantha Ciricillo, but includes input from design team members Justin Brown, Alyssa
Matarazzo, Kyle Tynan, and faculty mentors Dr. Thomas Stanford and Dr. Vincent Van
Brunt. Mostly informal meetings were held throughout the period of HAZOP analysis to
gain input from the group members and mentors.
Major Results and Findings
The HAZOP analysis identified as the main concern for the plant to be the ratios of
ethylene and ethylene oxide to oxygen in the reactor. If the lower flammability limit or
upper flammability limit of ethylene was reached in the reactor, then any spark near the
system could cause an explosion in the plant. The concentrations of oxygen, ethylene, and
ethylene oxide as well as their ratios should be monitored by the control system in the plant.
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Assurance of proper flows within the piping is also an important factor, and flow meters
should be placed throughout the plant to monitor the streams. Emergency procedures
should be put into place for shutdown in the event of any issues with these ratios or with
feed or product stream malfunctions. These procedures will be crucial in protecting the
lives of the plant personnel.
Additionally, over-pressurization is a concern in the reactor. Many factors can
cause pressure to build up in the reactor unit, such as a runaway reaction or lack of product
flow out of the reactor. For this reason, a pressure relief system in the reactor is crucial.
The implementation of this system is described in the “Future Work” section of the report.
A pressure relief system should be implemented in the separation unit as well to protect
from a potential explosion. A situation like this occurred in 1991 at the Union Carbide
ethylene oxide plant in Sea Drift, TX where the separation unit over-pressured and caused
extensive damage[5]. The pressure of the system should be monitored using a controls
system, and pressure relief measures should be put into place. Additionally, there should
be an emergency shutdown procedure put into place in case of a buildup of pressure.
The temperature of the system should also be monitored through a control system
and controlled through heating or cooling jackets on the vessels, especially the reactor.
Temperature is important for the kinetics of the reaction and for proper heat of reaction to
be met. Additionally, temperature is important for pressure regulation in the reactor. Lack
of temperature control could lead to an uncontrolled reaction, which is especially unsafe
when dealing with oxygen and hydrocarbons that could lead to explosions in uncontrolled
ratios. Emergency shutdown procedures are important in the event of temperature increase
above a maximum or decrease below a minimum, as well as a loss of temperature control.
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Finally, it is important to do routine checks and maintenance of the piping, reactor,
flow meters, valves, control system, and any involved units to assure proper function.
Buildup of material in the reactor or piping could cause issues with the reaction or
corrosion. Additionally, leaks are possible if the equipment is not checked routinely for
damage or corrosion. Procedures should be put in place for the occurrence of leaks or the
necessity of non-routine maintenance to assure the safety of the operators, engineers, and
other staff in the plant. Preventative maintenance should be performed on equipment every
6 months to prevent failure of the system or the equipment materials. An updated HAZOP
analysis is necessary for the equipment anytime an update is made or there is a malfunction
after which the equipment must be adjusted and restarted. This should be at least at a
frequency of every 3 years.
Future Work
The design of this plant is completely theoretical; therefore, a plant will not be built
or run in the future based on this design. For this reason, the “Actions Required” detailed
in the HAZOP analysis chart (Appendix B) were not implemented in the design. However,
it is still important to consider how these actions would be implemented. Some of the
actions would be added to the design far before the plant is running. For example, relief
sizing is an important aspect for safety. Every unit would need to be considered for a
different type of relief system, and then that relief system would need to be sized for that
unit[6]. For example, the reactor would likely need a spring-loaded relief valve because the
mixture of chemicals is not corrosive by nature and is not acutely toxic[3]. The pressure
drop between the vessel and the valve should be no more than 3% of the set pressure, so
no more than 63 kPa[3],[6]. The relief valve could be added to the HYSYS simulation and
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sized in HYSYS[7]. The mixture should go to a properly-sized flare drum or series of flare
drums to be combusted in a controlled environment to form CO2 and water, which are not
hazardous[3]. These relief system considerations would need to be continued for every unit
in the process.
Other pre-planned precautions include many of the controls of the plant. A control
system should be established in the plant in order to monitor temperature, pressure, flow,
concentration, and other process parameters that would affect the safety of the plant. This
system allows for safety procedures to be implemented as well as for the process to be
monitored, which is helpful for business in the long run. If there are reoccurring issues in
a process, the engineers can take this control data, investigate the underlying issue, and
suggest new solutions. Control systems can be linked to alarms and warnings in case plant
personnel need to evacuate in the event of a leak or overpressure.
In addition to these pre-planned safety features in the plant, it is of utmost
importance that plans be put into place for proper safety operating procedures to be
followed. These plans need to include standard operating procedures, routine equipment
checks, routine equipment maintenance plans, and emergency shutdown procedures.
Having these procedures and teaching them to all plant personnel reduces the chance of a
catastrophic incidence occurring in the plant. If everybody is aware of possible failures in
the plant and how to mitigate the effects of those issues, then the plant environment is safer.
New hires should go through extensive safety training, and each employee should receive
continued safety training throughout his or her entire time at the plant. If everyone is
committed to doing their part for the safety of the plant, emergencies can be minimized for
everyone.
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Conclusions
Through this process, it has become clear that safety is a crucial consideration in
the design of a chemical plant. A thorough safety review and hazard analysis should be
performed before any plant is built as well as after the plant is complete and ready for
startup. So many disasters are possible, and awareness is the first step to preventing these
disasters from occurring. If all plant personnel are on board with making the plant safer,
then the probability of a catastrophe can be reduced. However, it is important that
throughout the design process, design engineers should consider how the plant can fail and
include design features to minimize those failures. The HAZOP methodology is a great
tool to bring awareness to these potential failures and consider how to prevent them.
However, the methodology is only as thorough as the committee performing the analysis,
so it is important that those personnel are responsible and diligent in their analysis. Overall,
this HAZOP analysis brings to focus the importance of safety analysis as a part of the
conceptual design of any chemical process.
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Appendix A: Process Flow Diagrams and Equipment List
Equipment List:
Equipment:
Air Heaters
AC-100
AC-101
AC-102
Condensors
C T-100
C T-101
C T-103
Heat Exchangers
E-100
E-101
E-102
E-103
E-104
E-105
E-106
E-106-2
E-107
E-108
E-100-A
E-101-A
E-102-A
E-103-A
E-104-A

Equipment:
Compressors/Expanders
K-100
K-101
K-102
K-103
K-104
K-105
K-106
Mixers
MIX-100
MIX-100-A
MIX-101-A
Pumps
P-100
P-101
P-102
P-100-A
Reactor
PFR-100
Reboilers
R T-100
R T-101
R T-103
R T-101-A

Equipment:
Reflux Drums
RD T-100
RD T-101
RD T-103
Reflux Pumps
RP T-100
RP T-101
RP T-103
Towers
T-100
T-101
T-102
T-103
T-100-A
T-101-A
Vessel
V-100-A
Valves
VLV-100
VLV-101
VLV-102
VLV-100-A
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Ethylene Oxide Process Flowsheet Part 1:
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Ethylene Oxide Process Flowsheet Part 2:
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Ethylene Oxide Process Flowsheet Part 3:
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Amine Absorber Flowsheet:
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Appendix B: Ethylene Oxide Production Plant HAZOP Analysis Worksheet

Item

Study
Node

Guide
Word

Process
Parameter

Deviations

Possible Consequences

Potential Causes

Actions Required
1.

1.
1.1

Reactor

None

Ethylene Flow

No ethylene flow

1.

1.2

Reactor

Higher

Ethylene Flow

Too much
ethylene flow

2.
3.

Excess oxygen could
react with any
possible fuel sources
in the reactor causing
uncontrolled
combustion

Could reach the UFL
and cause an
explosion
Pressure could build
up in tank causing an
explosion
Ethylene could leak
into plant

1.
2.
3.

1.
2.

Clog in ethylene
line
Valve failed
closed in ethylene
line
Not enough
ethylene in storage

Flow rate input
too high
Valve failed
opened in ethylene
line

Routinely check
ethylene lines for
build up or
corrosion
2. Routinely check
the level of
ethylene storage
tank
3. Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams fail
1. Add interlocks in
controls to limit
flow rate below a
maximum
2. Set valves to fail
closed
3. Monitor ratio of
oxygen to ethylene
to keep from
reaching UFL
4. Add a PRV into
tank
5. Routinely check
ethylene lines for
leaks/have leak
procedure in place
6. Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
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1.

2.

1.3

Reactor

Lower

Ethylene Flow

Too little
ethylene flow

1.

Could reach the LFL
and cause an
explosion

1. Clog in ethylene
line
2. Not enough
ethylene in storage

3.

4.

1.
2.
1.
1.4

Reactor

Reverse

Ethylene Flow

Ethylene flow
reverses

Pressure could build
up in pipes and
storage tank causing
an explosion

1.

1.
1.
2.1

Reactor

None

Oxygen Flow

No oxygen flow

Ethylene is extremely
flammable and could
combust if it comes
in contact with a
spark

2.
3.

High pressure in
reactor could
cause flow to
reverse

Clog in oxygen
line
Valve failed
closed in oxygen
line
Not enough
oxygen in storage

3.

1.

2.

streams
malfunction
Routinely check
ethylene lines for
build up or
corrosion
Routinely check
the level of
ethylene storage
tank
Monitor ratio of
oxygen to ethylene
to keep from
reaching LFL
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams fail
Add a PRV to the
tank
Add check valves
to ethylene line to
prevent back flow
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams
malfunction
Routinely check
ethylene lines for
build up or
corrosion
Routinely check
the level of
ethylene storage
tank

18

3.

1.

2.
3.
1.
2.2

Reactor

Higher

Oxygen Flow

Too much
oxygen flow

2.
3.

Could reach LFL and
cause explosion
Pressure could build
up in tank and cause
explosion
Oxygen could leak
into plant

1. Flow rate input
too high
2. Valve failed
opened in oxygen
line

4.
5.

6.

1.

2.3

Reactor

Lower

Oxygen Flow

Too little oxygen
flow

1.

Could reach UFL and
cause explosion

1. Clog in oxygen
line
2. Not enough
oxygen in storage

2.
3.

Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams fail
Add interlocks in
controls to limit
flow rate below a
maximum
Set valves to fail
closed
Monitor ratio of
oxygen to ethylene
to keep from
reaching LFL
Add a PRV into
tank
Routinely check
oxygen lines for
leaks/have leak
procedure in place
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams
malfunction
Routinely check
oxygen lines for
build up or
corrosion
Routinely check
the level of oxygen
storage tank
Monitor ratio of
oxygen to ethylene
to keep from
reaching LFL
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4.

1.
2.
1.
2.4

Reactor

Reverse

Oxygen Flow

Oxygen flow
reverses

Pressure could build
up in pipes and
storage tank causing
an explosion or leak

1.

High pressure in
reactor could
cause flow to
reverse

3.

1.
1.

3.1

Reactor

None

Product Flow

No product flow

2.

1.
2.
3.2

Reactor

Higher

Product Flow

Too much
product flow

3.

Pressure could build
up in the reactor and
could cause
explosion
Ethylene or ethylene
oxide could combust
with oxygen in the
reactor

Ethylene oxide could
leak into plant
Separator pressure
may increase
Unreacted reactants
could flow out of the
reactor too quickly
and would be in an
uncontrolled ratio

1.
2.

Clog in product
line
Valve failed
closed in product
line

2.
3.
4.

1.
1.
2.
3.
4.

More reacted than
anticipated
Product flow rate
set too high
Valve failed open
in product line
Pressure in reactor
too high

2.
3.
4.

Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams fail
Add a PRV to the
tank
Add check valves
to ethylene line to
prevent back flow
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams
malfunction
Regularly check
product line for
build up or
corrosion
Make sure product
line valves are fail
open
Add PRV to the
reactor
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when
product stream fails
Set controls for
product flow rate to
limit it to a
maximum
Routinely check for
leaks in the product
line
Add a PRV to
separator
Add PRV to reactor
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that could cause an
explosion

5.

1.

3.3

Reactor

Lower

Product Flow

Too little product
flow

1.

Pressure in reactor
could build up and
cause explosion

1.
2.

Clog in product
line
Valve closed
partially open

2.
3.

1.

1.
3.4

Reactor

Reverse

Product Flow

Product flow
reverses

2.

Pressure could build
up in the reactor and
could cause
explosion
EO could backflow
into ethylene or
oxygen lines

1.

Pressure in reactor
could be too low
causing reverse
product flow

2.
3.

4.

4.1

Reactor

Higher

Pressure

Pressure too high

1.

Reactor material
could weaken

1.

Uncontrolled
reaction occurs

1.

Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when
product stream
malfunctions
Regularly check
product line for
build up or
corrosion
Make sure product
line valves are fail
open
Add PRV to reactor
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when
product stream fails
Monitor reactor
pressure on DCS
system and have
emergency
procedures in
place
Add PRV on
reactor
Add check valves
to product lines,
ethylene lines and
oxygen lines
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when
product stream
malfunctions
Monitor reactor
pressure on DCS
system and have
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causing leak or
explosion

2.

3.
4.

Too much of a
certain flow
coming into
reactor
Too little product
flow out of reactor
Temperature
increases
dramatically

2.
3.

4.
5.
5.

1.
1.
2.
4.2

Reactor

Lower

Pressure

Pressure too low

EO line could back
flow into the reactor
2.
Uncontrolled
amounts of oxygen or
ethylene could go
3.
into the reactor and
react without
supervision
4.

Not enough
reactant coming
into the reactor
Too much product
flow leaving the
reactor
Temperature
dramatically
decreases
Reaction is less
than anticipated

6.
7.

8.

5.1

Reactor

Higher

Temperature

Temperature too
high

1.

Reactor could
overheat

1.

Incoming reactant
temperature is too
high

1.

emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Add valve controls
onto product and
reactant lines
Monitor reactor
temperature on
DCS and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Add PRV to reactor
Add thermal
control jacket to
reactor
Monitor reactor
pressure on DCS
system and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Add valve controls
onto product and
reactant lines
Monitor reactor
temperature on
DCS system and
have emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Add thermal
control jacket to
reactor
Add thermal
control jacket to
reactor
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2.

3.

Materials could
decompose into
unknown or
unwanted chemicals
Reactor pressure
could increase

2.

Reaction
thermodynamics
proceed in an
uncontrolled
fashion

2.

3.

1.
2.
1.
5.2

Reactor

Lower

Temperature

Temperature too
low
2.

Reaction kinetics
would be affected
and the reaction
would be
unpredictable
Reactor pressure
could decrease

1.

Incoming reactant
temperature is too
low
3.

1.
1.
6.1

Reactor

Less Than

Volume

Not enough
volume in reactor
2.

Reaction kinetics
would be affected
and the reaction
would be
unpredictable
Reactor pressure
could increase

1.

Build up of
material inside the
reactor would
cause the available
volume to
decrease

2.

Monitor reactor
temperature on
DCS system and
have emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Monitor reactor
pressure on DCS
system and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Add thermal
control jacket to
reactor
Monitor reactor
temperature on
DCS system and
have emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Monitor reactor
pressure on DCS
system and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Routinely check for
buildup in the
reactor and clean
the reactor.
Monitor reactor
pressure on DCS
system and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
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1.

1.
7.1

7.2

7.3

Reactor

Reactor

Reactor

None

Higher

Lower

Reaction

Reaction

Reaction

1.

Ethylene and oxygen
could combust
causing pressure and
temperature build up

1.

Too much EO would
be formed causing
pressure buildup in
reactor
EO could also leak
into the plant

No reaction
occurs

Higher
conversion than
expected

Lower
conversion than
expected

2.

1.

Ethylene and oxygen
would be in an
uncontrolled ratio in
the reactor

2.

1.
2.

1.
2.

Catalyst fouling
or deactivation
Ignition
temperature for
reaction is not met
at the reactor
conditions

Temperature is too
high
Kinetics proceed
uncontrolled

Temperature is too
low
Kinetics proceed
uncontrolled

Routinely monitor
catalyst for
effectiveness
2. Monitor reactor
pressure on DCS
system and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
3. Monitor reactor
temperature on
DCS system and
have emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
1. Control
temperature
through DCS and
thermal jacket
2. Monitor the
concentration of
ethylene oxide in
the product stream
and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
1. Control
temperature
through DCS and
thermal jacket
2. Monitor the
concentration of
ethylene oxide in
the product stream
and have
emergency
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1.

7.4

Reactor

Faster

Reaction

Reaction occurs
too fast

1.

EO could react with
incoming oxygen and
cause combustion

1.
2.

Temperature is too
high
Kinetics proceed
uncontrolled

2.

1.

1.
7.5

Reactor

Slower

Reaction

Reaction occurs
too slow

Ethylene and oxygen
would be in an
uncontrolled ratio in
the reactor

1.
2.

Temperature is too
low
Kinetics proceed
uncontrolled

2.

1.

7.6

Reactor

As Well As

Reaction

Side reactions
occur along with
the anticipated
reactions

1.

Uncontrolled/unantici 1.
pated side reactions
could cause
unwanted products

Impurities in the
reactants could
cause side
reactions

2.

shutdown
procedures in place
Control
temperature
through DCS and
thermal jacket
Monitor the
concentration of
ethylene oxide in
the product stream
and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Control
temperature
through DCS and
thermal jacket
Monitor the
concentration of
ethylene oxide in
the product stream
and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Purify the reactants
as much as possible
through separations
Monitor the
concentration of
ethylene oxide in
the product stream
and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
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1.

7.7

Reactor

Other Than

Reaction

Reactions other
than those
anticipated occur

1.

1.
Uncontrolled/unantici
pated reactions could
cause unwanted
2.
products

Impurities in the
reactants could
react
Ethylene could
completely
combust

1.

Issues in the
oxygen feed
system, a
compressor fails
for example

2.

1.
8.1

Reactor

Higher

Ethylene
Concentration

Concentration of
ethylene is too
high

1.

This could reach an
unsafe ratio of fuel to
oxygen.

2.
1.

1.
8.2

Reactor

Lower

Ethylene
Concentration

Concentration of
ethylene is too
low

1.

This could reach an
unsafe ratio of fuel to
oxygen.

Impurities in
stream could
cause the
concentration to
be too low

2.

1.
1.
9.1

Reactor

Higher

Oxygen
Concentration

Concentration of
oxygen is too
high

1.

Oxygen
Concentration

Concentration of
oxygen is too
low

1.

This could reach an
unsafe ratio of fuel to
oxygen.
1.

9.1

Reactor

Lower

This could reach an
unsafe ratio of fuel to
oxygen.

Issues in the
ethylene feed
system, a
compressor fails
for example
Impurities in
stream could
cause the
concentration to
be too low

2.
1.
2.

Purify the reactants
as much as possible
through separations
Monitor the
concentration of
ethylene oxide in
the product stream
and have
emergency
shutdown
procedures in place
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams fail
Routine checking
of feed stream
operability
Purify the reactants
as much as possible
through separations
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams fail
Implement safe
shutdown of the
reactor when feed
streams fail
Routine checking
of feed stream
operability
Purify the reactants
as much as possible
through separations
Implement safe
shutdown of the
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reactor when feed
streams fail
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Appendix C: Detailed Calculations
Lower and Upper Flammability Limits of Ethylene at Reactor Temperature and Pressure:
Ethylene is an unsaturated alkene, therefore the parameters to calculate the UFL and LFL
are as follows[8]:
! = 0.4265
) = 3.41
Then the Cst value needs to be calculated[3]:
,- ./ + 31- → 2,1- + 2.- 1
,34 =

100
100
=
= 6.54
3
678 1- :7; <76)=>?7@
1
+
(
)
1+(
)
0.21
0.21

Therefore, at T = 25°C and P = 2100 kPa[8]:
BCB = ! × ,34 = 0.4265 × 6.54 = 2.79%
HCB = ) × ,34 = 3.41 × 6.54 = 22.30%
To find these values at the reactor temp of 240°C, the heat of combustion is needed[9]:
∆.J = −1411.20

LM
L<!8
= −337.29
678
678

Therefore, at T = 240°C[3]:
BCB = BCB-N −
HCB = HCB-N +

0.75
0.75
(O − 25) = 2.79 −
(240 − 25) = 3.27%
∆.J
−337.29

0.75
0.75
(O − 25) = 22.30 +
(240 − 25) = 21.82%
∆.J
−337.29

The LFL does not change much with high pressure, but to find the UFL at the reactor
pressure of P = 2100 kPa gauge = 2.201 MPa abs[3]:
HCB = HCBQ R4S + 20.6(log(W) + 1) = 21.82 + 20.6(log(2.201) + 1) = 49.48%
Therefore, at reactor temperature and pressure:
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BCB = 3.27%
HCB = 49.48%
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